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 Investigating the development of the internal and external service tasks 
of non-executive directors: The case of the Netherlands (1997-2005) 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
During the last decade, globalization and liberalization of financial markets, changing 
societal expectations and corporate governance scandals have increased the attention for 
the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors. In this context, recent corporate 
governance reform initiatives have emphasized the control task and independence of non-
executive directors. However, little attention has been paid to their impact on the external 
and internal service tasks of non-executive directors. Therefore, this paper investigates 
how the service tasks of non-executive directors have evolved in the Netherlands. Data 
on corporate governance at the top-100 listed companies in the Netherlands between 
1997 and 2005 show that the emphasis on non-executive directors’ external service task 
has shifted to their internal service task, i.e. from non-executive directors acting as 
boundary spanners to non-executive directors providing advice and counseling to 
executive directors. This shift in board responsibilities affects non-executive directors’ 
ability to generate network benefits through board relationships and has implications for 
non-executive directors’ functional requirements.  (Word count: 156) 
 
Key words: Corporate governance codes, non-executive directors and the Netherlands 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last ten years, the globalization and liberalization of financial markets and 
stronger societal demands for accountability and transparency of companies have placed 
the fiduciary duties of non-executive directors in the centre of the corporate governance 
debate. Recent corporate governance scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in the 
United States, Parmalat in Italy and Ahold in the Netherlands have heated the 
international corporate governance debate (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2005; Jonsson, 
2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003) and they have triggered worldwide corporate 
governance reforms (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan 
et al., 2006). This has resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, corporate 
governance directives in the European Union and additional national corporate legislation 
across the European Continent. In addition, most European countries have introduced 
new corporate governance codes such as the Cromme Code in Germany (2002), the 
Bouton Report in France (2002) and the Combined Code in the United Kingdom (2003). 
 
Although the effectiveness of corporate governance codes in disciplining corporations 
and preventing corporate governance scandals has been questioned (Cools, 2006; Enrione 
et al., 2006), these codes are important reflections of corporate governance developments, 
societal norms and values, and expectations of key stakeholders. They highlight to society 
which improvements are central for regaining the trust in corporate governance systems 
and how corporations can enhance their legitimacy (Dacin, 1997; Ocasio, 1999; Oliver, 
1997). Given this background, it is not strange that corporate governance codes, in line 
with principles from the agency theory, have attempted to strengthen the control task and 
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the independence of non-executive directors (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al., 2006). 
However, the impact of these reform initiatives on the service tasks of non-executive 
directors has been largely neglected. In fact, the emphasis on board control and board 
independence may hamper non-executive directors’ external service task in providing 
access to resources on which corporations are dependent (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972; 
1973) and they may limit their task in corporate learning through board relationships 
(Mizruchi, 1996; Westphal et al., 2001). Furthermore, the emphasis on board control and 
independence may undermine non-executive directors’ internal service task in providing 
advice and counseling to executive directors (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; McNulty 
and Pettigrew, 1999). After all, interdependence, maintenance of closeness and a focus on 
joint value creation are necessary for fostering the external and internal service tasks 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hamel et al., 1998). 
 
This raises the question as to how the external and internal service tasks of non-executive 
directors have been affected by corporate governance codes, triggered by broad corporate 
governance developments. By addressing this question in the Dutch financial market, the 
paper makes two main contributions. First, it describes how two Dutch corporate 
governance codes with an emphasis on the control task and the independence of non-
executive directors relate to the external and internal service tasks of non-executive 
directors. We find empirical evidence that corporate governance measures taken to 
reinforce board control may hamper non-executive directors’ external service task, while 
reinvigorating their internal service task. Second, by describing how non-executive 
directors fulfill their service tasks in a two-tier board context, we provide a more 
 4
thorough understanding of the functioning of the two-tier board model regarding these 
tasks. 
 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section one provides a short description of the 
Dutch corporate governance context, i.e. the two-tier board system, recent developments 
and corporate governance reform initiatives. Section two elaborates on the external and 
internal service tasks of non-executive directors and discusses how provisions in two 
Dutch corporate governance codes - aimed at strengthening the control task of non-
executive director - are related to their service tasks. Section three portrays the evolution 
of the service tasks of non-executive directors on supervisory boards of the top-100 listed 
corporations at the Euronext in Amsterdam between 1997 and 2005. Section four 
concludes with a discussion of our main findings and their implications for corporate 
governance scholars and practitioners. 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Most Dutch listed corporations have a two-tier board consisting of a management board 
and a supervisory board. The supervisory board solely consists of non-executive directors 
to assure its independence. It is responsible for the supervision of the management board 
and it assists executive directors with advice and counseling (Maassen and Van den 
Bosch, 1999; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004). In line with this board model, the 
supervisory board has the fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interests of the 
company and all the company’s stakeholders.  
 Over the last ten years, Dutch financial markets have seen dramatic changes. The 
liabilities of non-executive directors have increased, the influence of shareholders has 
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grown significantly, the financial press and general public have become more vocal and 
critical, and private equity and hedge funds have become more active (Hamel et al., 1998; 
Maassen, 1999). Moreover, Dutch supervisory boards have internationalized and the 
financial board’ networks have changed (Heemskerk et al., 2003; Heemskerk, 2007; 
Spencer Stuart, 2006). These developments have resulted in an increasing convergence of 
the Anglo-American shareholder model and the Rhineland stakeholder model in the 
Netherlands, i.e. increasing communalities between the one-tier board model and the two-
tier board model (Collier and Mahbub, 2005; Maassen and Van den Bosch, 1999). In this 
context two Dutch corporate governance codes have been introduced since 1997. Both 
codes address the above mentioned corporate governance developments, societal norms 
and values and the expectations of key stakeholders. Thereby, they highlight several 
important topics of the corporate governance debate in the Netherlands and their 
development and introduction might have affected and adjusted what non-executive 
directors in reality are doing (Mace, 1971; 1972; Ocasio, 1999; Huse, 2007). 
 
The first corporate governance committee, the Peters Committee, was an initiative of 
representatives from the Association of Securities Issuing Companies and the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. The committee published its forty recommendations in 1997 and 
initiated a public corporate governance debate to introduce best practice provisions and to 
improve board practices on the basis of self-regulation (Maassen, 1999).  
 In 2003, a second corporate governance committee published the Tabaksblat 
Code. In contrast to its predecessor, this code was an initiative of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Affairs, its scope was wider and aimed at legislative changes if needed. 
Although the Tabaksblat Code is based on self-regulation, a recent amendment to Dutch 
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corporate law legally binds listed companies to explain deviations from the Tabaksblat 
code’s recommendations in their annual reports. The amendment also requires companies 
to obtain the approval of the general meeting of shareholders for any deviation from the 
code based on a “comply or explain” regime. Table 1 provides an overview of the main 
commonalities and differences between the Peters Code and the Tabaksblat Code. 
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------------- 
 
THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SERVICE TASKS OF NON-EXECUTIVES  
Traditionally, the primary responsibility of the supervisory board has been to control the 
management board to assure that executive directors are acting in the best interests of 
shareholders. This control responsibility is rooted in agency theory and deemed necessary 
for counteracting the potential for managerial opportunism, which can arise as a result of 
the separation between corporate ownership and management (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). Supervisory boards are an important internal control mechanisms for 
shareholders (Daily et al., 2003; Hendry and Kiel, 2004) as they have the authority to 
nominate, reward and remove executive directors from office and to ratify audit reports, 
capital investments and other key corporate decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Johnson et al., 1996). Based on principles from the agency theory, corporate governance 
reform initiatives have generally emphasized board independence to avoid conflicts of 
interest of directors and third parties. By maintaining a distance from executive directors 
and by having a focus on the prevention of failures, non-executive directors are ascribed 
the position to adequately supervise management boards. 
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 As an additional task, scholars have recognized the service tasks of non-executive 
directors and supervisory boards. Social Network Theory, Resource Dependence Theory 
and the Resource Based View have emphasize that non-executive directors are able to 
contribute positively to corporate decision-making as sources of knowledge (Huse, 1998; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Huse (2005; 2007) distinguishes between the external and 
internal service tasks of non-executive directors. The external service task focuses on 
value that is created through the relationships non-executive directors have with external 
actors and is rooted in Social Network Theory and Resource Dependence Theory. The 
internal service task emphasizes corporate value that is created by non-executives by 
providing advice and counseling to executive directors and originates from the Resource 
Based View. In contrast to the control task with its emphasis on board independence, the 
maintenance of interdependence, closeness and a focus on joint value creation is necessary 
to be able to utilize the external relations and internal knowledge and capabilities that 
non-executives bring along (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hamel et al., 1998). Table 2 
provides an overview of the external and internal service tasks and juxtaposes them 
against the control task. The following sections discuss both service tasks in more detail.  
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
----------------------------- 
 
The External Service Task of Non-Executive Directors 
Social Network Theory and Resource Dependence Theory emphasize corporate value 
that accrues from the external network position of non-executive directors (Huse, 2005; 
Mizruchi, 1996). Social Network Theory asserts that interlocking directorates constitute 
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an important learning vehicle through which corporations can tap into the knowledge 
base of interlock partners (Mizruchi, 1996). Past evidence suggests that these board ties 
can influence a whole array of corporate decision-making outcomes, such as mergers and 
acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993), the initiation of strategic renewal (Westphal et al., 2001) 
and the adoption of board protection devices (Davis, 1991). Furthermore, Resource 
Dependence Theory asserts that board ties are used to incorporate resources from the 
environment, like legal expertise, political lobbying power and financial resources on 
which companies are dependent. Past evidence suggests that organizations indeed use 
board relationships to secure access to financial resources (Pfeffer, 1972) and adjust their 
board structure and composition to cope with environmental uncertainties (Boyd, 1990; 
Hillman et al., 2000).  
  
 While interlocking directorates may provide corporations with network benefits 
and improve corporate performance, Dutch corporate policy makers have been worried 
about these relationships for several reasons. First, board relationships might jeopardize 
the independence of non-executive directors. Stakeholders, while influencing companies 
through interlocking directorates, may become too involved in the boards’ decision-
making processes and may have serious conflicts of interests. Second, a highly 
centralized and dense network of non-executive directors might create a social insular 
system in which board members are loyal to each other and merely act as rubber stamps. 
Third, as the number of board positions of non-executive directors increases, it may 
become more difficult for non-executive directors to devote enough time and effort to 
profoundly understanding the particularities of a company and to be an effective monitor. 
To negate these board network effects, the Peters Code (1997) and the Tabaksblat Code 
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(2003) have introduced (1) a limitation on the total number of board positions a non-
executive director may have on supervisory boards of listed companies (a maximum of 
five within listed corporations; chair positions count as two board positions) and (2) a 
limitation on the election of  non-executive directors who had significant business 
relationships with the company one year prior to their appointment. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the recommendations in the Peters Code (1997) and the Tabaksblat Code 
(2003).  
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
--------------------------- 
 
The Internal Service Task of Non-Executive Directors 
The Resource Based View of the firm emphasizes value that accrues from the internal 
position of non-executive directors (Huse, 2005). With their (management) experience, 
industry knowledge and decision-making capabilities, non-executive directors may 
provide valuable advice and counseling during corporate decision-making processes 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Rindova, 1999; Stiles, 2001). Recent 
evidence from Anglo-American oriented countries suggest that non-executive directors 
perceive their contributions in this area to be important to the performance of 
corporations (Heracleous, 2001; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2005; Stiles, 2001). Other 
studies indicate that non-executive directors are increasingly involved in decision-
management (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). Joint board 
meetings of executive and non-executive directors on the board and board committees 
composed of executives and non-executives facilitate the internal service task of non-
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executive, because these two structural communication mechanisms enable the regular 
exchange of knowledge and ideas between executive and non-executive directors.  
  
 Although joint board meetings and board committees composed of executive and 
non-executive directors might compromise the independence of non-executive directors 
and hamper the adequate execution of the control task, Dutch policy makers have been 
relatively silent about this. The Peters Code (1997) and the Tabaksblat Code (2003) only 
suggest that the supervisory board evaluate its own functioning and relation with the 
management board once a year without executive directors being present. Generally, 
supervisory boards in the Netherlands comply with this principle (83,5%; Spencer Stuart, 
2006). Furthermore, seen from an agency perspective, both Dutch corporate governance 
reforms have advocated the use of independent monitoring committees (selection and 
appointment, remuneration and audit committees) to support the internal control task of 
supervisory boards (see table 4 for the code recommendations).  
  At the same time, the code provisions may have supported the internal service 
task with their emphasis on the installation and role of board committees. First, executive 
directors often attend meetings of supervisory board committees, which in the Dutch two-
tier board system by default consist of non-executive directors (Maassen, 1999; Maassen 
and Van den Bosch, 1999). Thereby, board committees become consultative forums also. 
Second, the scope of topics discussed in (monitoring) board committees tends to go 
beyond control issues and touches upon service issues as well (Spira and Bender, 2004). 
Third, the use of additional board committees associated with the internal service task, 
such as strategy and integrity committees, might have been promoted as well (Maassen 
and Van den Bosch, 1999; Spencer Stuart, 2006). In a similar vein, the stronger emphasis 
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on board control might have stimulated the number of supervisory board meetings. As it 
is common practice in the Netherlands that executive directors join the meetings of non-
executive directors, the intensity of advising and counseling may have increased also. In 
conclusion, the strengthening of the control task of non-executive directors as a result of 
corporate governance developments and the introduction of the codes may therefore have 
fostered the internal service task simultaneously. 
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
--------------------------- 
 
METHODS AND SAMPLE 
The empirical research focuses on the supervisory boards of the top-100 listed companies 
at the Euronext in Amsterdam, including all AEX, AMX and AScX companies. Together, 
these companies represent seven industries (construction, manufacturing, transport and 
communication, wholesale, retail, financial services, and other services) and constitute 
the backbone of the Dutch economy. The top-100 listed corporations for each year were 
selected on the basis of the average market capitalization. Supervisory board data for the 
companies were collected for the period 1997-2005. During this period, 54 percent of the 
composition of the top-100 remained the same. During the first year of this period, the 
Peters Committee published their forty recommendations and started a formal national 
corporate governance debate in the Netherlands which resulted in the Tabaksblat Code in 
2003. The data were obtained from the Spencer Stuart Netherlands Board Indexes that 
contain information on non-executive directors who occupied more than 8,000 board 
positions on supervisory boards in the Netherlands during this time period. The data were 
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checked and complemented by data obtained from the Worldscope and Reach databases, 
and annual reports. Overall, this resulted in 900 firm-year observations. 
 
To utilize the external relationships and internal knowledge and capabilities that 
non-executive directors bring along and to manage resource dependencies (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Hamel et al., 1998), interdependence, maintenance of closeness and focus 
on joint value creation are necessary (see table 2). Therefore, an important indicator for 
the functioning of the service tasks is the presence of organizational mechanisms that 
facilitate the actual exchange of knowledge, information and resources, i.e. structural 
communication mechanisms at the board level (Zahra and George, 2002). In this study 
we assess how several board communication mechanisms related to the functioning of the 
external and internal service tasks have evolved in the light of corporate governance 
developments and reform initiatives in the Netherlands. 
 To portray developments in the external service task of non-executive directors, 
the following indicators were used: (1) the average number of ties a focal top-100 listed 
company has with other top-100 listed companies through formal ties at the supervisory 
board level, (2) the average number of ties a top-100 listed company has with financial 
service providers listed in the top-100 (banks, insurance companies and investment 
funds) through formal ties at the supervisory board level, and (3) the average number of 
ties a focal top-100 listed company has with the top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, ING, 
Fortis) through formal ties at the supervisory board level. Multiple interlocks with the 
same company were counted as one, because we are not interested in the strength of 
network relationships in the light of our research question. All indicators represent formal 
board mechanisms that facilitate the external service task of non-executive directors, i.e. 
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the first indicator represents networking and the other two indicators used represent the 
presence of financial resource dependencies at the supervisory board level (see table 2).  
 To portray developments in the internal service task of non-executive directors, 
the following indicators were used: (1) the average number of joint board meetings of 
non-executive and executive directors per listed company, (2) the average number of 
board committees per listed company, (3) the average number of board committee 
meetings of listed companies that operate at least one board committee, and (4) the 
average size of board committees of listed companies that operate at least one board 
committee. The indicators reflect characteristics of two formal board communication 
mechanisms (joint board meetings and board committees) that facilitate the internal 
service task of non-executive directors, i.e. providing advice and counseling to executive 
directors (see table 2).  
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Developments in the External Service Task of Non-Executive Directors  
As corporate policy makers in the Netherlands are concerned with the adverse impact of 
board relations on the independence of non-executive directors, the corporate governance 
codes introduced a limitation on the number of board memberships and a restriction on 
resource dependencies within board relationships. Table 5 provides an overview of the 
developments with regard to interorganizational board relations. As shown, the average 
number of board relationships has decreased over time (-34.3%). Interestingly, the largest 
drop in the average number of board ties is observable right after the Tabaksblat Code 
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became effective: from 6,1 ties in 2003 to 5,0 ties in 2004 (-18.3%). Overall, this 
indicates that the potential for board network benefits is diminishing. 
 Scholars have noted that financial services providers often have a central role in 
the network of interlocking directorates. These network relationships provide financial 
services providers an ability to monitor and control indebted firms, while organizations 
may have greater access to financial resources (Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer, 1972). Although 
Dutch financial services providers have been the most highly networked corporations for 
a long period, their position has been declining since 1976 (Heemskerk et al., 2003). The 
provisions in the Dutch corporate governance codes seem to have affected their network 
position also. Table 5 reveals that the average number of ties top-100 listed companies 
have with listed financial service providers (banks, insurance companies and investment 
funds)  through ties at the supervisory board level decreased from 0.94 ties in 1997 to 
0.66 ties in 2005 (-29.8%). Furthermore, the average number of board relations focal top-
100 listed companies have with the top-3 listed banks (ABN Amro, ING, Fortis) through 
ties at the supervisory board level decreased from 0.56 ties in 1997 to 0.28 ties in 2005 (-
50.0%). Interestingly, the largest drops in average numbers of finance-related board 
relationships are again observable right after the Tabaksblat Code became effective. 
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
-------------------------- 
 
Developments in the Internal Service Task of Non-Executive Directors 
As noted earlier, the attention paid to the monitoring task and the independence of non-
executive directors has prevailed in the Netherlands. Corporate policy makers have been 
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relatively silent about the internal service task of non-executive directors. Table 6 
portrays the developments of two board mechanisms that facilitate the internal service 
task of non-executive directors: (1) joint board meetings with executive and non-
executive directors, and (2) board committees (the average number, number of meetings 
and size). As shown, the average number of joint board meetings increased from 5.9 to 
7.0 meetings between 1997 and 2005 (+18.6%). During this period, the average number 
of board committees per company increased as well from 0.67 board committees in 1997 
to 1.04 and 1.94 board committees in 2001 and 2005 (+ 189.6%). Interestingly, most 
corporations seem to have established board committees in anticipation of the Tabaksblat 
Code, as the largest growth in the number of board committees is observable during the 
period 2001-2003 and the trend increasingly flattens thereafter. The average number of 
meetings of these board committees increased from 2.3 to 3.5 times annually (+ 36.2%). 
The average size of board committees developed differently. Until 2002, the average size 
decreased from 3.3 to 3.0, while it subsequently increased to 3.5 in 2005 (+ 4.9% over the 
period). However, the change in average committee size appeared to be not significant. 
 
------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 here 
-------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Several self-regulatory and legislative corporate governance initiatives were introduced 
to financial markets during the last decade. These initiatives are important reflections of 
corporate governance developments, societal norms and values and expectations of key 
stakeholders. Seen from an agency perspective, these reform initiatives have emphasized 
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the control task of non-executive directors, while non-executive directors’ service tasks 
have not been in the center of policy makers’ attention. Archival data of the top-100 
listed companies in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2005 reveal that the two Dutch 
corporate governance codes have affected non-executive directors’ external and internal 
service tasks. Non-executive directors in the Netherlands have become less involved in 
their external service task between 1997 and 2005 as: 
 
• the average number of ties with top-100 listed firms through supervisory board 
ties decreased significantly (-34%), 
• the average number of ties with top-100 listed financial firms through supervisory 
board ties decreased significantly (-30%), 
• the average number of ties with top-3 listed banks (ING, ABN Amro and Fortis) 
through supervisory board ties decreased significantly (-50%). 
 
At the same time non-executive directors in the Netherlands have become more involved 
in their internal service task between 1997 and 2005 as: 
 
• the number of joint board meetings increased significantly (+19%), 
• the average number of board committees per company (+190%) and the intensity 
of their involvement increased significantly (+36%). 
 
The changing involvement of non-executive directors in their external and internal 
service tasks in response to corporate governance reform initiatives has three major 
implications for non-executive directors and corporations. First, as the task of providing 
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advice and counseling to executive directors grows in importance, the scope of board’s 
responsibilities broadens and non-executive directors increasingly spent more time and 
effort on fulfilling their internal service task adequately. Together with increasing board 
liabilities, more pressure is put on the non-executive function and therefore the pool of 
willing and well-qualified non-executive directors becomes more limited. According to 
Peij (2005), this will increasingly lead to a professionalization of the non-executive 
directors’ function in the Netherlands. Second, the changing service position of non-
executives has implications for the selection of non-executive directors. Instead of mainly 
selecting non-executives on the basis of their external board network position, other 
qualifications may become more important. This suggests that selection criteria such as 
the cognitive fit with other board members, industry experience and decision-making 
capabilities will grow in importance in the near future (Rindova, 1999). Third, the 
declining importance of interlocking directorates may adversely affect the strategic and 
financial performance of listed companies. As learning opportunities become more scarce 
and the management of resource dependencies through board ties becomes more difficult, 
corporations have to search for alternative information means to secure their overall 
external network position. 
 
The study has several limitations, but provides avenues for future research also. First, in 
the study we have solely focused on formal board communication mechanisms associated 
with the internal and external service tasks of supervisory boards. This raises for example 
the question how informal board communication mechanisms relate to these formal 
mechanisms. Scholars have for instance noted that informal board network relations may 
be more influential and insular than formal board network relations (Ghoshal et al., 1994; 
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Tsai, 2002). Future studies could investigate whether the development of these informal 
board communication mechanisms follows the same pattern as the development of formal 
board mechanisms (see for example Heemskerk, 2007) and what both developments 
jointly imply for board task performance and corporate performance. 
 Second, the board network measures we used provide no direct evidence on the 
quality and importance of board relationships. Companies may have reacted to corporate 
governance pressures by disposing non-vital board relations only. Furthermore, the board 
network measures used only take into account board relationships between top-100 listed 
corporations. Increasing levels of internationalization at the supervisory board level may 
have made the international board network more important (the number of foreign non-
executive directors grew from 16.0% in 1997 to 24.6% in 2005 (Spencer Stuart, 2006)), 
while board network ties with non-listed corporations may provide valuable alternatives 
as well. Future research should take these issues into consideration when assessing 
developments in the board network in the Netherlands. 
 Third, the described board developments might be contingent on the specifics of 
the corporate governance context in the Netherlands. Future cross-country research 
studies could investigate to which extent the same patterns are observable in other 
countries with two-tier board systems (for instance Germany and Austria) and in 
countries with one-tier board systems (for instance Great Britain and the United States). 
 Fourth, the study is silent about the dynamic processes by which listed companies 
have reacted to corporate governance reform initiatives and have adapted the external and 
internal service tasks. Interestingly, the indicators show that in the case of board network 
ties (table 5), companies appear to react to code recommendations afterwards. In the case 
of internal communication mechanisms (table 6), companies appear to have anticipated 
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the codes’ recommendations. Future studies applying institutional theory (e.g. Dacin et 
al., 2002; Ocasio, 1999) would be valuable to investigate how corporations in different 
institutional contexts have responded to corporate governance reforms. And whether the 
different legal groundings of the Peters Code (self-regulation) and the Tabaksblat Code 
(‘comply or explain’) led to different changes and patterns in board practices discussed.  
 
The study indicates that although corporate governance reforms have mainly emphasized 
the control task and independence of non-executive directors, they seem to have changed 
as unintended consequences the involvement in the external and internal service tasks of 
non-executive directors also. Corporate policy makers should take these unanticipated 
effects into account prior to the introduction of corporate governance reform initiatives.  
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Table 1: The Peters Code versus the Tabaksblat Code 
Code Attributes  Peters Code  Tabaksblat Code 
 
● Publication Date  ●  October 28, 1997 ●  December 9, 2003   
 
● Initiator(s)   ●  Association of Securities Issuing ●  Ministry of Finance and  
   Companies (VEUO), Amsterdam  Economic Affairs 
   Stock Exchange (AEX) 
 
● Composition of   ●  Representatives from the VEUO  ●  Representatives from the VEUO 
the Governance  and AEX, non-executive directors,  and AEX, non-executive directors, 
Committee   and professional experts and professional experts 
 
● Main Purpose   ●  Initiating a national corporate ●  Improving the corporate 
   governance debate governance system by providing 
    principle-based best practices 
 
● Short   ●  40 best practices about the  ●  Detailed principles and best 
Description   relations between management practice provisions about the 
   boards, supervisory boards and relations between management 
   investors boards, supervisory boards and 
    investors 
 
● Audience   ●  All companies with registered  ●  All companies with registered 
   offices in the Netherlands and offices in the Netherlands and 
   whose shares are listed on a whose shares are listed on a 
   recognized stock exchange recognized stock exchange 
 
● Legal Grounding  ●  No; Self-regulation ●  Yes; Comply or explain principle 
Sources: Peter’s Code (1997), Tabaksblat Code (2003) and Maassen (1999) 
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Table 2:The Building Blocks of the Control Task and External and Internal Services Tasks 
Building Blocks  Control Task External Service Task  Internal Service Task 
 
● Description Task ●  Monitoring and  ●  Acquiring access to ●  Provision of advice  
  supervision of  resources on which the  and counseling to  
  executive directors corporation is dependent executive directors 
   and networking 
 
● Theoretical   ●  Agency Theory ●  Resource Dependence ●  Resource Based 
Perspective(s)    Theory and Social View of the Firm 
    Network Theory    
 
● Value creation   ● ..monitoring skills ●  .. external relations ● ... knowledge and 
through...   and capabilities of of non-executives  cognitive capabilities 
   non-executives    of non-executives 
 
● Characteristics   ●  Independence, ●  Interdependence,  ●  Interdependence, 
   distance, focus on closeness, focus on closeness, focus on 
    prevention of failures joint value creation joint value creation 
Sources: Zahra and Pearce (1989), Johnson et al. (1996), Daily et al. (2003). Adapted from Huse 
(2005:72, table 1), Huse (2007:39, table 3.1) and Hamel et al. (1998:201) 
 
Table 3: Control Enhancing Code Recommendations that also Relate to the External Service Task 
Board Mechanisms  Specific Recommendations in Peters Code and Tabaksblat Code 
 ● ‘The number of supervisory seats at listed companies held by a single 
 individual should be limited in such a way as to guarantee the satisfactory  
 fulfillment of the allotted tasks’ (Recommendation 9, Peters Code, 1997). 
  
 ● ‘A management board member may not be a member of the supervisory  
●  Network Ties board of more than two listed companies. Nor may a management board 
 member be the chairman of the supervisory board of a listed company’ 
 (II.1.7, Tabaksblat Code, 2003). 
 
 ●  ‘The number of supervisory boards of Dutch listed companies of which an 
 individual may be a member shall be limited to such an extent that the proper 
 performance of this duties is assured; the maximum number is five, for which 
 purpose the chairmanship of a supervisory board counts double’ (III.3.4, 
 Tabaksblat Code, 2003). 
 
 ● ‘A supervisory board member shall be deemed independent if […] he has 
 [not] had an important business relationship with the company, or a company  
● Network Ties  associated with it, in the year prior to the appointment. This includes the case 
Representing were the supervisory board member, or the firm of which he is shareholder, 
Financial Resource partner, associate or advisor, has acted as advisor to the company (consultant, 
Dependencies external auditor, civil notary and lawyer) and the case where the supervisory 
 board member is a management board member or an employee of any bank 
 with which the company has a lasting and significant relationship’ (III.2.2.c, 
 Tabaksblat Code, 2003). 
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Table 4: Control Enhancing Code Recommendations that also Relate to the Internal Service Task 
Board Mechanisms  Specific Recommendations in Peters Code and Tabaksblat Code 
 ● ‘The supervisory board should consider the appointment of a selections 
 and appointments committee from among its members, as well as an audit 
 committee and a remunerations committee’ (Recommendation 15, Peters  
 Code, 1997) 
 
●  Board Committees ● ‘If the supervisory board consists of more than four members, it shall 
 appoint from among its members an audit committee, a remuneration 
 committee and a selection and appointment committee. The function of the 
 committees its to prepare the decision-making of the supervisory board’ 
 (III.5, Tabaksblat Code, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The Changing External Service Task of Non-executive Directors within Top-100 
Listed Companies  – Evidence from the Netherlands (1997-2005) 
 
Board Mechanisms 
 
1997 
 
2005 
% change 
1997-2005 
 
1) Average number of ties with top-100 listed firms 
through supervisory board ties 
 
7.49 a)
 
 
4.92 a)
 
 
-34.3%* 
 
2) Average number of ties with top-100 financial 
services providers through supervisory board ties 
 
0.94 a)
 
 
0.66 a)
 
 
- 29.8 %* 
 
3) Average number of ties with top-3 listed banks (ING, 
ABN, Fortis) through supervisory board ties 
 
0.56 a)
 
 
0.28 a)
 
 
-50.0%* 
 
* T-tests show that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.05-level  
a) Number of cases is 100 
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Table 6: The Changing Internal Service Task of Non-executive Directors within Top-100 
Listed Companies  - Evidence from the Netherlands (1997-2005) 
 
Board Mechanisms 
 
1997 
 
2005 
% change 
1997-2005 
 
1) Average number of joint board meetings per listed 
company 
 
 
5.90 a) 
 
 
 
7.00 a)
 
 
 
+ 18.6%* 
 
2) Average number of board committees used per listed 
company 
 
 
0.67 b) 
 
 
 
 
1.94 b)
 
 
+ 189.6%* 
 
3) Average number of board committee meetings of 
listed companies that have at least one board committee 
 
 
2.32c) 
 
 
 
3.51 c) 
 
 
 
+ 36.2%* 
 
4) Average size of board committees of listed 
companies that have at least one board committee 
 
 
3.29 d) 
 
 
 
 
3.45 d)
 
 
+ 4.9% 
 
* T-tests show that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.05-level 
a) Number of cases is 70 (1997) and 96 (2005); b) Number of cases is 85 (1997) and 100 (2005)    
c) Number of cases is 14 (1997) and 70 (2005); 36 (1997) and 74 (2005) firms had committees      
d) Number of cases is 21 (1997) and 74 (2005); 36 (1997) and 74 (2005) firms had committees 
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